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Abstract
Verifying Network Topology in Software Deﬁned Networks Using
Stealthy Probing-based Veriﬁcation (SPV)
Amir Alimohammadifar
Since a key advantage of Software Deﬁned Networks (SDN) is providing a logically
centralized view of the network topology, the correctness of such a view becomes
critical for SDN applications to make the right management decisions. However,
recently discovered vulnerabilities in OpenFlow Discovery Protocol (OFDP) show
that malicious hosts and switches can poison the network view of the SDN controller
and consequently lead to more severe security attacks, such as man-in-the-middle
or denial of service. Several solutions have been proposed to address such topology
poisoning attacks, but their scope is mostly limited to malicious hosts injecting or
relaying fake Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) packets. In this work, we propose
Stealthy Probing-based Veriﬁcation (SPV), a novel stealthy probing-based approach,
to signiﬁcantly extend the scope of existing solutions. Speciﬁcally, SPV incrementally
veriﬁes legitimate links and detects fake links by sending probing packets. Such
packets are sent in a stealthy manner to deceive malicious hosts or switches who may
be trying to identify the probing attempts among normal traﬃc. To illustrate the
feasibility of our approach, we implement SPV in an emulated SDN environment
using Mininet and OpenDaylight. We further evaluate the applicability and the
performance of SPV in a real SDN/cloud topology. We show that SPV can achieve a
iii
very low veriﬁcation time (i.e., less than 120 milliseconds) in both real and emulated
environments which makes SPV a scalable solution for large SDN networks.
iv
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The hope to overcome the current limitations of traditional networks, e.g., com-
plexity and dynamic nature, diﬃculties to conﬁgure and manage the network, fault
tolerance issues, etc., lies in the emergence of a new network paradigm, namely, Soft-
ware Deﬁned Networks (SDN), by separating the network’s control and data planes
[27, 21, 57]. The empowerment of SDN controllers has become a double-edged sword
leading to both convenience in network management and an increase in dependability
on these SDN controllers. More speciﬁcally, the SDN controller is meant to be the op-
erating system of SDN and provides a logical view of the network to its applications,
which run on top of SDN controller by making use of the programmable interface that
the SDN controller provides to them [27, 57]. Thus, these applications heavily rely
on the SDN controller for the correctness of the logical view of the network to make
proper network management decisions, such as routing, load balancing, ﬁrewalling,
monitoring, etc. [18]. Therefore, the validity of the network view provided by the
SDN controller becomes critical for the proper functionalities of its applications and
in general, of SDN.
However, the recently discovered vulnerabilities in the OFDP protocol show that
malicious hosts or switches can create fake links to poison the network view of the
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SDN controller [25]. More speciﬁcally, there exist at least three diﬀerent variations of
such attacks [14, 19, 6, 11]: i) injecting fake LLDP packets, ii) relaying LLDP packets
using compromised hosts and iii) relaying LLDP packets using compromised switches.
We further illustrate the topology poisoning attacks in the following subsection.
1.1 Motivation
Figure 1 illustrates a simple SDN topology with the presence of an application plane,
a logically centralized SDN controller, and an underlying data plane which includes
OpenFlow switches, and existing hosts. In this example, we assume there are two
malicious hosts H1 and H2, and a malicious switch S22. The link discovery is performed
via the OFDP protocol along with LLDP packets. These switches and their links
(solid lines in the ﬁgure) consist of the network view of the data plane from the
SDN controller. In the following, we utilize this network view to demonstrate three
diﬀerent poisoning attacks.
• The relaying LLDP packets attack by hosts, involves two malicious hosts, i.e.,
H1 and H2, to create a fake link between the switches S13 and S14 (the dashed
line between switches S13 and S14 in Figure 1). To this end, whenever host H1
receives an LLDP packet from switch S13 (in OFDP protocol, a switch adver-
tises the received LLDP packet in all its outgoing ports that may be connected
to hosts or other switches), host H1 may send the received LLDP packet to
host H2 using an out-of-band link. In the next step, host H2 may forward the
same packet to the switch S14, and according to the OFDP protocol, switch
S14 forwards the LLDP packet to the SDN controller. Upon receiving the
LLDP packet (that was initially sent to switch S13) from switch S14, the SDN




































Figure 1: Fake link creation in SDN topology
and S14 (details of SDN link discovery and OFDP protocol are discussed in
Section 2.1.3).
• The fake LLDP packet injection attack involves forging the LLDP packet re-
ceived from switch S13 by the malicious host H1 to create a fake link between
switches S13 and S14, shown by the dashed line in Figure 1. To this pur-
pose, host H1 should initially discover some information about speciﬁcations,
e.g., MAC address, of switch S13 to be able to forge the LLDP packet received
from switch S13 and sends it (using an out-of-band link) to switch S14 (or any
other switch to create the fake link between switch S13 and the target switch).
Utilizing the discovered information, host H1 masquerades itself as switch S13
and sends the forged LLDP packet towards switch S14. Similarly as in the ﬁrst
attack, switch S14 assumes the packet is sent from switch S13 and forwards the
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received LLDP packet to the SDN controller which creates a fake link between
switches S13 and S14 in the network view of the SDN controller.
• The relaying LLDP packet attack by switches, involves a malicious switch i.e.,
S22 as shown in Figure 1, to create a fake link by modifying its ﬂow tables
to relay LLDP packets received from switch S23 towards switch S24. Being
unaware of this attack, switch S24 legitimately sends the relayed LLDP packet
received from switch S22 back to the SDN controller; which results in a fake
link creation between switches S23 and S24 (shown by dashed line in Figure 1
between switches S23 and S24) in the network view.
Table 1 summarizes the above-mentioned attacks and their existing solutions. To
overcome the fake LLDP packet injection attack, several works (e.g., [19, 14, 4, 8])
mitigate this problem to some extent, by extending the functionality of the SDN
controllers or modifying the OFDP protocol to harden it. To tackle the relaying
LLDP packets using compromised hosts, Dhawan et al. [14] address this issue by
assuming the ﬂow of a packet in the network is not manipulated. Finally, detecting
poisoning the network view by making use of compromised switches that relay LLDP
packets for this purpose, is still an open issue. In summary (as shown in Table 1), no
existing work completely overcomes the above-mentioned attacks.
Table 1: Comparing existing solutions with SPV






TopoGuard [19] Yes No No
SPHINX [14] Yes Yes No
HMAC Authenticated LLDP [4] Yes No No
Detecting a Compromised Switch [12] No No No
OFDPv2 [45] No No No
sOFTDP [8] Yes No No
Stealthy Probing-based Veriﬁcation (SPV) Yes Yes Yes
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Poisoning the network view of the SDN controller can result in more severe attacks
such as man-in-the-middle, denial of service, as well as incorrect network management
decisions such as wrong routing, wrong load balancing, etc. [19, 18, 25], that might
put the network into a critical situation. Therefore, the need for link veriﬁcation
to identify these poisoning attacks is crucial for proper functionalities of an SDN
infrastructure.
1.2 Thesis Statement
In this work, we propose a novel approach of actively sending probing packets in
a stealthy manner in order to incrementally verify legitimate links and to identify
fake links in the SDN network topology view. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst design stealthy
probing packets in a manner that these packets remain indistinguishable from normal
traﬃc. Second, we provide detailed methodology and algorithms of our approach,
namely, SPV. As a proof of concept, we implement and test SPV in an emulated
SDN environment using Mininet [38] network emulator and OpenDaylight [1] SDN
controller.
1.3 Contributions
Our main contributions in this work are as follows.
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst solution which can detect all three
types of topology poisoning attacks (as demonstrated in Figure 1) based on the
innovative idea of employing active probing in a stealthy manner.
• We design the SPV to be separated from the SDN controller implementations
such that SPV can be easily adapted to any implementation of SDN controller.
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Moreover, the implementation of SPV using OpenFlow-based SDN environment
demonstrates the practicality of our approach.
• We evaluate SPV through extensive experiments both by making use of the
topology of a real SDN/cloud hosted at one of the largest telecommunication
vendors and by using synthetic data. The obtained results show that SPV
achieves a constant veriﬁcation time, i.e., less than 120 milliseconds for link
veriﬁcation, which conﬁrms the scalability of our solution when applied to large
size SDN networks.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 considers preliminaries
of SDN and its topology discovery mechanism, our threat model, and the related
work to this dissertation. Chapter 3 provides the design goals of SPV and discusses
our methodology, i.e., SPV. Chapter 4 provides the implementation details and the
experiments. Chapter 5 analyzes the security of SPV and discussions SPV’s limita-
tions. Contributions to other projects are carried over Section 6 and ﬁnally, Section
7 concludes this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries and Related Work
The ﬁrst section of this chapter provides preliminaries of our work. Then we deﬁne
our thread model in the second section of this chapter. The third section, discusses
literature related to our work.
2.1 Background
This section provides an extensive overview of OpenFlow-based Software Deﬁned
Networks (SDN) and its topology discovery mechanism, i.e., OpenFlow Discovery
Protocol (OFDP). We also discuss some security issues related to OFDP protocol
which leads to topology poisoning attacks in SDN and its related consequences.
2.1.1 SDN Overview
For several years, variations of devices, such as repeaters, bridges, hubs, routers, and
switches, have been developed and deployed to be utilized in networks to keep ﬁl-
tering and forwarding network packets from one to another destination. However,
the demand of recent evolving technologies is to have faster and more resilient net-
works through modern data centers that can carry over millions of Virtual Machines
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(VM) and users which can be no longer achieved through traditional networks due to
some reasons, such as the complexity, owning, management and maintenance costs,
dynamic nature that needs regular and manual conﬁguration of devices, and so on
[17, 27, 57].
To overcome the above-mentioned issues and achieve the goals, computer scientists
came up with a solution to separate the control and forwarding tasks from networking
devices by leaving the forwarding plane inside the networking devices while handing
the control plane to another device. This idea was ﬁrst presented by [15] which deﬁnes
diﬀerent elements for forwarding and controlling those forwarding devices through a
protocol, namely, ForCES. The idea of separating the control and forwarding planes
leads the networking devices to be simply forwarding units which are managed by a
logically centralized controller, namely, SDN controller, which works as an operating
system of the network. The SDN evolvement leads it to a three-layered architec-
ture [17, 27, 57, 21, 51, 2] (as shown in Figure 2): i) the application layer, which
consists of diﬀerent applications that manage the entire data plane, ii) the control
plane (i.e., SDN controller), and iii) the data plane, which comprises the forwarding
devices and their connecting links.
Each layer comprises some components. The application layer consists of dif-
ferent applications that manage the entire data-plane network through the control
layer. These applications can be monitoring, security, networking or other kinds of
business applications. The SDN controller(s) lies in the control layer. Each SDN
can have one or multiple SDN controllers, that can be seen as one logically central-
ized controller. There are diﬀerent controllers available as of today, POX [47], NOX
[40], OpenDayligh [1], Floodlight [48], Beacon [13], Ryu [49], etc. The underlying
data plane comprises forwarding devices or switches and the links between them.



























Figure 2: SDN 3-Layer Architecture
A widely used software-based open source SDN device is OVS [42] switches. The
mentioned layers communicate through APIs. The application and controller layers
communicate through northbound API that has not been standardized yet; However,
the most widely used API for the controller and data-plane communications or the
southbound API is the OpenFlow protocol [36, 17]. Other available southbound inter-
faces are OVSDB [46], ForCES [15], POF [53], PCEP [29], NETCONF [16], etc. The
OpenFlow speciﬁcation [41] deﬁnes how the controller should communicate with un-
derlying data-plane devices i.e., OpenFlow switches as well as providing the deﬁnition
and speciﬁcations of OpenFlow switches. The overview of the OpenFlow protocol is
detailed in the following subsection.
9
1. TCP Connection Establishment
2. TLS Tunnel Establishment







Figure 3: Bootstrapping Process
2.1.2 The OpenFlow Protocol
The general description of OpenFlow protocol [36, 41] is discussed in this section.
In general, the OpenFlow protocol deﬁnes the communications between data-plane
devices and the control plane SDN controllers. It also provides how the data-plane
devices should react under certain circumstances such as actions they should do when
they receive a packet. Note that the OpenFlow protocol is a small subset of massive
SDN technology, therefore, its job is not to deﬁne the SDN controller behavior [17, 36].
The description of the important processes deﬁned in OpenFlow protocol, which are
utilized in this thesis, is discussed in the following.
2.1.2.1 OpenFlow Switch Bootstraping Process
The very ﬁrst step of an OpenFlow switch to get involved in an SDN is to introduce
itself to the SDN controller and receives instructions of how to react in the network
upon receiving a packet [36, 41, 11]. Therefore, as depicted in Figure 3, whenever
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an OpenFlow switch joins an SDN, it ﬁrst establishes a TCP connection with the
SDN controller through a secure channel (i.e., TLS, which is optional) to start boot-
strapping process which involves exchanging some control messages. Afterwards, the
SDN controller and the newly joined OpenFlow switch exchange OFTP_HELLO mes-
sages to agree on the OpenFlow version they use for further communications. After
agreement on the OpenFlow version, the SDN controller requests for switch’s spec-
iﬁcations, such as MAC address of its ports, through the OFTP_FEATURE_REQUEST
message. The switch informs the SDN controller of its speciﬁcations using the
PFTP_FEATURE_RESPLY message. Finally, the SDN controller installs some conﬁgura-
tions on the switch by making use of an OFTP_SET_CONFIG message. At this point, if
there are any proactive ﬂows to be installed on the switch, the SDN controller installs
them using an OFTP_FLOW_MOD message (note that we do not show the exchange of
this message in the above-mentioned ﬁgure since it is not part of the bootstrapping
process).
2.1.2.2 OpenFlow Switch Packet Forwarding Process
After successful installation of an OpenFlow switch in an SDN, as described in Sec-
tion 2.1.2.1, the OpenFlow switch starts its functionality by forwarding the received
packets based on its ﬂow tables. However, diﬀerent situations might occur based on
the matching results. As a basic functionality of an OpenFlow switch is to receive a
packet on one port, modify it if necessary, and forward it on another port. Therefore,
each OpenFlow switch has a set of ﬂow tables that comprise ﬂow entries for packet-
matching function. In this packet-matching function, whenever an OpenFlow switch
receives a packet, it matches the packet with the ﬂows of its tables, which there could
be a match or a no-match, to make a decision which might be either of the following






2. OFTP_PACKET_IN + PKT_i
3. OFTP_PACKET_OUT + INSTRUCTIONS: [DROP PKT_i]
4. Drop PKT_i 
1. Received PKT_i
2'. OFTP_PACKET_IN + PKT_j
4'. Install FLOW_j
1'. Received PKT_j
3'. OFTP_FLOW_MOD + REACTIVE FLOW_j
Figure 4: Packet Forwarding Process for a Packet with no Match in Flow Tables
(iii) forwarding the packet to the controller for further instructions.
Note that in an OpenFlow switch, there are diﬀerent types of ﬂows in its ﬂow
tables for packet matching which are proactive, reactive, or hybrid ﬂows. Proactive
ﬂows are ﬂow entries that are installed by SDN controller upon joining a switch to the
network whereas reactive ﬂow entries are installed with the help of the SDN controller
upon receiving a packet that there is no match for it in the existing ﬂow entries. The
hybrid ﬂow is a combination of both proactive and reactive ﬂows. To utilize reactive
ﬂows, an OpenFlow switch must communicate with the SDN controller to receive
proper instructions for forwarding the packets that there is no match for them in
its ﬂow tables. To this end, whenever a new packet is received, after performing
packet-matching, if there is no match for the packet, the OpenFlow switch encapsu-
lates the received packet in an OFTP_PACKET_IN message and forwards it to the SDN
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controller and waits for further instructions. After the SDN controller receives the
OFTP_PACKET_IN message, it makes a decision of what has to be done with the packet
and sends the proper instructions towards the mentioned switch. For example, if new
ﬂows are to be installed, the SDN controller sends an OFTP_FLOW_MOD message along
with the new ﬂows to be installed, which are called reactive ﬂows, on the switch so
that the switch can utilize those ﬂows to forward the received packet or similar further
packets that might be received afterward. As another example, if the packet should
be dropped, the SDN controller sends an OFTP_PACKET_OUT message along with the
instructions to drop the packet, towards the switch [17, 36, 11]. The above-mentioned
examples are depicted in Figure 4.
2.1.3 SDN Topology Management Service
One of the main advantages of SDN controller is the centralized network view that
it oﬀers, which enables reliable topology management, traﬃc engineering, resource
provisioning, etc. [25]. In OpenFlow-based SDN, after an OpenFlow switch joins to
the network, it establishes a TCP connection with the SDN controller. Afterwards,
the SDN controller requests the switch for its active ports and their respective MAC
addresses using the OFTP_FEATURE_REQUEST message. The switch replies with an
OFTP_FEATURE_REPLY message containing the requested information which is needed
for topology discovery.
Although there is no speciﬁc standard for discovering the topology of an
OpenFlow-based SDN, most SDN controllers’ implementations follow the OFDP pro-
tocol relying on LLDP packets [19]. Figure 5 shows the steps of how an SDN controller
utilizes the OFDP protocol and LLDP packets to discover the network topology:
Step (1): the SDN controller encapsulates an LLDP packet (Figure 5 shows the
LLDP packet format) into OFTP_PACKET_OUT message and sends it to switch S11
13
Step 3: PKT_IN[LLDP]




























Figure 5: OFDP protocol and LLDP packet format
along with a set of instructions. The ﬁelds CHASIS_ID and PORT_ID indicate which
switch the LLDP packet is designated to. Step (2): the instructions in the received
OFTP_PACKET_OUT message, instructs switch S11 to advertise the received LLDP
packet in all its ports except the port it receives the packet from. Step (3): switches
S13 and S14 send the LLDP packet along with their CHASIS_ID and PORT_ID of the
port they have received the LLDP packet from, back to the SDN controller. based on
the received packets, the SDN controller can discover the link between switches S11
and S13 as well as the link between switches S11 and S14. SDN controller discovers
all the links, in both directions, by performing the similar procedure for all network
switches and updates its view of the network periodically.
2.2 Threat Model
Due to the lack of authentication for LLDP packets, malicious hosts or malicious
switches can create fake links in the view of the SDN controller by injecting false
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LLDP packets or relaying LLDP packets. Those attacks have been already discussed
in several works [4, 8, 9, 11, 19, 25]. Similar to those works, we assume that an
adversary may compromise one or more host(s) and/or switch(es) in the network.
S/he can send information through the compromised hosts using the out-of-band
links, and modify the ﬂows of the compromised switches. Furthermore, s/he is able
to distinguish between host-generated packets and SDN control packets. S/he can
sniﬀ packets, modify them, and inject them into the network. Consequently, the in-
scope threats in our work include all the three types of poisoning attacks mentioned
in Section 1.
We assume the SDN controller is uncompromisable and the established control
channels between the SDN controller and OpenFlow switches are trusted, and thus
attackers can only attempt to distinguish probing packets based on their contents.
On the other hand, the conﬁdentiality and integrity of public-private key pairs that
are installed on switches are preserved, and the implementation or speciﬁcation of
switch software remains unmodiﬁed.
2.3 Related Work
There has been a considerable eﬀort tackling traditional networks’ topology poisoning
issues since the latter might have a signiﬁcant impact on the network functionality.
For instance, poisoning attacks can manipulate routers’ network view [39] to cause
forwarding black holes, traﬃc redirection (e.g., to a compromised destination for
eavesdropping purposes) [55, 23] or to further mount Spanning Tree Protocol (STP)
mangling attacks [44], etc.
Although SDN is a recent networking paradigm, several approaches have already
been proposed to address the SDN controller’s network view poisoning problem either
15
as attack detection mechanisms or as security enhancement techniques. In the fol-
lowing, we provide a review of both approaches. We also discuss active probing-based
techniques.
2.3.1 SDN Topology Poisoning Attack Detection Mechanisms
TopoGuard. In [19], two new network topology poisoning attacks are introduced,
namely, Host Location Hijacking and Link Fabrication, exploiting vulnerabilities in
current link discovery and host tracking services in OpenFlow-based SDN. In Host
Location Hijacking Attack, an attacker abuse the Host Tracking Service (HTS) of an
SDN controller, which is responsible to track the location of hosts in the network, by
spooﬁng a hosts identity. Using HTS, an SDN controller keeps the track of the hosts’
locations by processing OFTP_PACKET_IN messages so that whenever a host moves to a
new location, the SDN controller can update its view over the network. If an adversary
manages to craft the identity of a host, she can send spoofed packets to deceive the
SDN controller of the target host’s location. To this end, the adversary sends the
spoofed packets into the network which will trigger OFTP_PACKET_IN messages to
be sent to the SDN controller. Once the SDN controller receives those messages, it
updates the location of the host to the new location which is, in fact, the attacker’s
location. The result is hijacking the traﬃc by the attacker which is in fact destined to
the original host. An example of the result of this attack is phishing an impersonated
website which is depicted in Figure 6 [19]. In the latter case, i.e., the Link Fabrication
attack, an adversary utilizes fake LLDP packets or relaying the LLDP packets to
maintain fake links in the view of the SDN controller. In fake LLDP packet injection
attack, a malicious host stores LLDP packets that are received from an OpenFlow
switch, then, the malicious host forges the LLDP packet with the identity of an






Figure 6: Web Client Harvesting [19]
other switch(es). Or, if the host has access to other switches, it relays the original
received LLDP packet to the target switch. Also, a malicious host may forward the
received LLDP packets between its ports towards target switch(es) without sending
them back to the controller. These mentioned attacks create fake links in the view
of the SDN controller (refer to Figure 1 to better understand the Link Fabrication
attacks).
Although TopoGuard mainly introduces the above-mentioned attacks, the authors
propose an OpenFlow-based SDN controller extension to prevent those vulnerabili-
ties. TopoGuard checks the legitimacy of switch ports and host migration to tackle
Host Location Hijacking, as well as verifying LLDP packets’ integrity by adding the
signature of switch data path ID (DPID) and port in an extra TLV ﬁeld of LLDP
packets using a cryptography hash function. Moreover, to verify host migration cor-
rectness, TopoGuard adds authentication to LLDP packets in order to identify those
packets generated by hosts aiming at poisoning the network view. However, unlike
SPV, TopoGuard cannot detect fake links caused by LLDP relay attacks.
SPHINX. SPHINX [14] allows detecting both known and potentially unknown at-










Figure 7: SPHINX Flow Graphs Between H1 and H4 [19]
attacks, and deﬁning administrative policies and verifying them against attacks on
SDN. To this end, SPHINX makes use of speciﬁc graphs, namely, ﬂow graphs, to ﬁrst
model the data plane. A ﬂow graph is a graph representation of data-plane ﬂows with
nodes being the endpoints and switches being the nodes. Due to the programmable
ability of SDN, diﬀerent ﬂow graphs might exist between two endpoints. For example,
as depicted in Figure 7, between two endpoints H1 and H4, two possible ﬂow graphs
are S13-S12-S2-S22-S24 and S13-S11-S1-S21-S24.
To incrementally build the ﬂow graphs, SPHINX processes speciﬁc OpenFlow
control messages, i.e., OFTP_FLOW_MOD, OFTP_STATUS_REPLY, OFTP_PACKET_IN, and
OFTP_FEATURE_REPLY, in order to model the data plane. In the last step, with the
help of the ﬂow graphs metadata and the mentioned pre-deﬁned administrative poli-
cies, SPHINX veriﬁes the discovered ﬂow graphs against the history of the metadata
and the pre-deﬁned administrative policies. Note that in this work the communica-
tions between the SDN controller and OpenFlow switches are assumed to be trusted.
In contrast to SPV, SPHINX cannot detect the creation of fake links in the topology,
which would falsify the generated ﬂow graphs based on which the data plane veriﬁca-
tion is performed. Furthermore, malicious switches that tend to relay LLDP packets
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remain undetected.
HMAC Authenticated LLDP. In [4], the authors propose an LLDP packets au-
thentication approach based on adding the HMAC of a switch ID and the correspond-
ing port ID to the LLDP packet into one of the unused TLV ﬁelds of an LLDP packet.
The packet format of an LLDP packet is already shown in Figure 5. Although this
method prevents the forged LLDP packets created by malicious hosts or soft switches
from creating fake links in the network view, contrarily to SPV, it cannot handle fake
link creation caused by relayed LLDP packets by malicious hosts or switches since it
solely depends on HMAC authenticated LLDP packets since relaying an LLDP packet
with a valid HMAC value in it, is still veriﬁed.
2.3.2 OFDP Security Enhancement Mechanisms
OFDPv2. In [45], an improved version of OFDP, namely, OFDPv2, is proposed.
OFDPv2 requires the SDN controller to send only one OFTP_PAKCKET_OUT message
containing an LLDP packet to a switch and instructs the switch to advertise the LLDP
packet on all its ports, instead of sending multiple OFTP_PAKCKET_OUT messages to
carry an LLDP packet to be forwarded on every port of each switch. Although in
OFDPv2 the topology discovery mechanism is changed and improved in comparison
to original the OFDP protocol, it lacks the authentication for LLDP packets and
hence suﬀer the same topology poisoning vulnerabilities and unlike SPV, there is no
veriﬁcation mechanism for data-plane links.
sOFTDP. The authors in [8] propose an improvement to the OFDP protocol, namely,
sOFTDP. The main idea is to transfer the burden of topology discovery from the
SDN controller to the data-plane switches. sOFTDP applies minimal changes to the
OpenFlow switch design to allow switches to detect topology changes and notify the
controller accordingly. Authenticated LLDP packets are used to avoid packet forgery,
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Table 2: Summary of SDN topology poisoning attack detection and OFDP security
enhancement mechanisms
Name Detection Approach Addressed Poisoning Attacks
TopoGuard [19] Authenticated LLDP packets Fake LLDP packet injection
SPHINX [14]
• Authenticated LLDP packets
• Flow graphs
• Administrative-policies
• Fake LLDP packet injection
• LLDP relay by hosts
HMAC Authenticated LLDP [4] Authenticated LLDP packets Fake LLDP packet injection
Detecting a Compromised Switch [12] Artiﬁcial packets None
OFDPv2 [45] Simplifying OFDP None
sOFTDP [8] • Authenticated LLDP packets• BFD sessions Fake LLDP packet injection
SPV • Authenticated stealthy packets• Active probing
• Fake LLDP packet injection
• LLDP relay by switches
• LLDP relay by hosts
and as port liveliness detection mechanism, whenever a switch joins the network, by
making use of some control messages through a 3-way handshake procedure, a Bidi-
rectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) session is established between switches in the
network to notify the controller of any port changes. Furthermore, to detect link
updates in the network, instead of sending LLDP packets periodically, sOFTDP uti-
lizes BFD session and notify the controller of the link updates. Note that sOFTDP
only relies on BFD session for link removals and ports failures through its designed
BFD_STATUS control message, and for link additions, it uses OFTP_PORT_STATUS mes-
sages. The reason behind this is to detect port or link failures that are also originating
from non-administrative decisions, i.e., failure of physical links or switch failures. Un-
like SPV, sOFTDP[8] do not verify fake link creation and furthermore, its vulnerable
to relaying BFD packet attack which is similar to relaying LLDP packet attack, so,
it still suﬀers from topology poisoning attacks.
Table 2 summarize and compares the above-mentioned related works.
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2.3.3 Active Probing Techniques
Probing techniques are typically used to maliciously infer network speciﬁcations (e.g.,
ﬁrewall rules, OpenFlow rules, bandwidth estimation, ﬂow tables usage and capacity,
etc.), in contrast to SPV where network probing is used as a defensive mechanism to
deceive malicious hosts and SDN switches. For instance, in [52], the authors utilize
the delay required for ﬂow installation on SDN switches to detect whether a network
is an SDN. INSPIRE [31] relies on some senders located inside the network, a receiver
deployed outside the network and a line sweep algorithm to select forged probing
packets to be sent to the network in order to infer OpenFlow rules. INSPIRE can
infer the ﬂow rules installation mode (i.e., proactive or reactive), by measuring the
delay between a packet sending time and its reception, then an apriori algorithm is
used to discover the rules. In [10], the authors use active probing techniques based on
crafted packets to trigger switch-controller communications, then they use round trip
time (RTT) and packet-pair dispersion features to infer information about ﬂow rules.
The authors in [30] also use probing and RTT measurement to infer the OpenFlow
switches’ tables capacity and usage along with the ﬂow rules’ hard and idle timeouts.
They also trigger controller-switch interactions by sending probing packets to infer
the processing time of a speciﬁc rule.
Similarly to our work, in [12], network probing is used as a defensive technique.
Therein, a periodic sampling-based approach is proposed to detect malicious Open-
Flow switches in an SDN. First, a switch is randomly chosen, then a set of ﬂow rules
are randomly selected from the switch’s ﬂow tables. Afterwards, artiﬁcial packets
are sent to the target switch to investigate whether the latter behaves properly upon
receiving those packets. Our eﬀort can be seen as complementary to this work since




In this chapter, ﬁrst we identify the goals to achieve with our proposal. Then we
discuss our methodology.
3.1 Design goals
The primary goal of SPV is near real-time veriﬁcation of data-plane links in an SDN
environment in an incremental manner to overcome the topology poisoning attacks
that are already mentioned in Section 1. Our target features include:
1. Designing a tool to verify data-plane links in an SDN while keeping the tool
independent of any SDN infrastructure specially the SDN controller.
2. Detecting network topology changes in the view of the SDN controller as soon
as they occur.
3. Generate stealthy probing packets out of the packets that are already traversing
the network to deceive the potential malicious switches which might try to






























































Figure 8: SDN and stealthy probing-based veriﬁcation (SPV) architecture
4. Designing the stealthy probing packets indistinguishable from other host-
generated packets inside the network.
5. Verifying the whole network topology with a very low response time.
3.2 SPV Design
This section elaborates our stealthy active probing-based veriﬁcation approach, i.e.,
SPV, to verify OpenFlow-based SDN data-plane links.
3.2.1 Architecture
Figure 8 depicts the architecture of SPV including its interactions with SDN. In order
to achieve our goals, i.e., verifying SDN data-plane topology using stealthy probing,
we indeed need to pursue certain requirements. The very ﬁrst requirement is to ac-
quire the knowledge of the network topology, which is data-plane switches, their ﬂows,
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and their connecting links. In the next step, we need to design and send stealthy prob-
ing packets towards the discovered switches and their connecting links. Finally, the
last step is collecting the stealthy packets and verifying the topology. To this end,
we design the SPV with two major modules each having corresponding sub-modules
to fulﬁll the above-mentioned requirements. Therefore, SPV has two major mod-
ules: Link Veriﬁcation and Stealthy Packet Handler. The Link Veriﬁcation module is
mainly responsible for identifying and verifying each update in the network topology
which comprises Link Update Checker, Topology Mapper, Flow Manager Applica-
tion and Link Veriﬁer sub-modules. The Stealthy Packet Handler module performs
packet collection, packet generation, and packet transmission through the Packet Lis-
tener, the Packet Generator, and the Packet Sender sub-modules, respectively. In the
following, we describe each module in details.
Link Veriﬁcation. This module is responsible for tracking and verifying the data
plane changes, by making use of stealthy probing packets, which comprises the fol-
lowing modules.
1. Link Update Checker. As the very ﬁrst step of SPV, the Link Update
Checker module is responsible for identifying updates in the network through
communications with the SDN controller1 and informing the Link Veriﬁcation
module of any changes made to the network.
This module is installed from the initialization of the network to verify the
network topology in an incremental manner.
2. Topology Mapper. This module maintains a tree data structure to locally
store the up-to-date topology information provided by Link Update Checker.
The tree stores the information of data-plane devices, i.e., if it is a host or
a switch or a link, along with their speciﬁcations, e.g., their status that is
1The communications is done via northbound API
24
up/down, and other useful information such as Device IDs, Port IDs and so on.
The stored information is later used by the Link Veriﬁer module for the purpose
of link veriﬁcation. Also, the tree is responsible to store the received updates
after veriﬁcation procedure to maintain the validity status of every switch and
their connecting links.
3. Flow Manager. This module works as an application to the SDN controller to
communicate through the northbound API for querying the ﬂows and statistics
of a given switch and installing a given ﬂow on a given switch. This module
interacts with the Link Veriﬁer module to perform the above-mentioned func-
tionalities and provide the results.
4. Link Veriﬁer. This module is the key component in SPV’s link veriﬁcation
procedure. The Link Veriﬁer module interacts with Topology Mapper, Flow
Manager Application and Stealthy Packet Handler modules. Based on the in-
put data from the Link Update Checker module, the Link Veriﬁer module com-
municates with the Topology Mapper module to get the link endpoints, and to
query the ﬂows and the statistics of them via the Flow Manager Application
module. Also, the Link Veriﬁer relies on the Stealthy Packet Handler module,
more speciﬁcally Packet Collector and Packet Generator modules, which are
responsible to generate the stealthy probing packets, and Packet Sender, which
is responsible to transmit the packets to be traversed through the links to be
veriﬁed.
Stealthy Packet Handler. This module is responsible for generating, sending
and collecting stealthy probing packets to/from data plane. Details of corresponding
modules are discussed below.
1. Packet Generator. This module is responsible to generate stealthy probing
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packets, namely, SPV_PKT packets, with the help of the Packet Collector module
upon receiving a request from the Link Veriﬁer module. The generation of
stealthy probing packets is performed using two diﬀerent algorithms (discussed
in Section 3.2.3) depending on two possible situations. (i) A link is being veriﬁed
for the ﬁrst time, and (ii) a certain link is being veriﬁed again, i.e., further rounds
of veriﬁcation for a certain link which is not yet veriﬁed, due to the reasons such
as loss of SPV_PKT packets.
2. Packet Collector. This module collects two types of packets. Firstly, it col-
lects and stores OFTP_PACKET_IN messages, that contain host generated packets
in their content, in its local database, namely, PKT_DB, which are later used
by Packet Generator in the stealthy packet generation algorithms. Secondly,
it collects and stores OFTP_PACKET_IN messages that have an SPV_PKT in their
content and report them to the Link Veriﬁer as soon as it collects them.
3. Packet Sender. This module manages to send stealthy probing packets to-
wards the source endpoint switches of the links to be veriﬁed. More speciﬁcally,
the ﬁrst responsibility of this module is to receive a stealthy probing packet and
information of the link to be veriﬁed from the Link Veriﬁer module. The second
responsibility is to send the received packet to be traversed through the link to
be veriﬁed.
3.2.2 Link Veriﬁcation Algorithm
This section describes the steps of Link Veriﬁcation mechanism.
Step 1: Tracking Network View Updates. The ﬁrst step of SPV is to capture
every change in the network topology and to maintain a local view of the network
state. To this end, the Link Update Checker continuously monitors the network view
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of the SDN controller to detect updates in the network topology starting from the
initialization of the network. As soon as an update is detected, the Topology Mapper
is informed to keep track of them by storing them locally. Then, the Topology Mapper
notiﬁes the Link Veriﬁer of the emergence of any new link added to the network view.
Example 1. Suppose in Figure 9 switch S14 is a malicious switch and tends to poison
the network view by creating a fake link between switches S11 and S12 (shown by
dashed lines in Figure 9) by relaying LLDP packets between switches S11 and S12.
In SPV’s design, the very ﬁrst step for link veriﬁcation is detecting updates in the
network topology view. So, Link Update Checker communicates with SDN controller
to get the new link information i.e., link S11:Port2-S12:Port2 (which is a fake link
and need to be validated). After detecting link S11:Port2-S12:Port2 via the Link
Update Checker module, the Topology Mapper is informed of the existence of this
new link and the link information is stored locally with the status of the link set to
“Not-Validated”. Then the Link Veriﬁer is informed of the new link that must be
validated.
Step 2: Collecting Data for Packet Generation. In this step, the Link Veriﬁer
obtains information about the newly added link along with the information of its
endpoint switches, their ﬂows, and statistics through the Flow Manager Application
module. Upon a request from the Link Veriﬁer, Stealthy Packet Handler generates an
SPV_PKT packet and sends it back (the details of generating the packet is discussed in
Section 3.2.3). This packet is a stealthy probing packet designed for the veriﬁcation
of a speciﬁc data-plane link.
Example 2. In this step (as shown in Figure 9), the Link Veriﬁer queries the ﬂows
and statistics of switches S11 and S12 via the Flow Manager Application module and
sends the queried information to the Packet Generator module. Upon receiving a







































Figure 9: Veriﬁcation of a newly added link utilizing SPV
packet, i.e., SPV_PKT packet, speciﬁc for verifying link S11:Port2-S12:Port2 (details
of generating SPV_PKT packet is discussed in Section 3.2.3) and send it back to the
Link Veriﬁer.
Step 3: Installing Flow to Forward SPV_PKT. The third step is mainly to
install a ﬂow to source endpoint switch of the link to be veriﬁed. Utilizing the link
information, i.e., link endpoints and their connecting ports, and the returned SPV_PKT
packet from the Packet Generator module, the Link Veriﬁer creates a ﬂow. Then, with
the help of the Flow Manager Application module, the created ﬂow is installed on the
source endpoint of the link to be veriﬁed. This ﬂow helps the source endpoint switch,
of the link to be veriﬁed, to forward the received SPV_PKT packet on its outgoing port
towards the destination endpoint switch of the link. Note that the ﬂow is generated
to forward a speciﬁc SPV_PKT packet towards another switch and is deleted from the
switch after a successful round of veriﬁcation of the given link. For the bi-directional
links, SPV follows the similar approach, but in both directions.
Example 3. Based on the received SPV_PKT packet and the information of link
S11:Port2-S14:Port2, Link Veriﬁer module generates and installs a ﬂow (shown
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by a shaded row in the ﬂow table, S11 Flow Table in Figure 9) on switch S11, i.e.,
the ﬂow to match the mentioned speciﬁc SPV_PKT to forward it on port S11:Port2,
with the help of the Flow Manager Application module.
Step 4: Collecting SPV_PKT Packets. Based on Step 3, this step mainly waits
until it receives the response from Stealthy Packet Handler module within a given
time threshold, and obtains the packet information of a received SPV_PKT packet.
Within the mentioned time threshold, if the Stealthy Packet Handler receives an
OFTP_PACKET_IN message with a content of the SPV_PKT packet, it informs the Link
Veriﬁer by sending the packet to it. Alternatively, if the packet is dropped for any
reason, after a certain timeout, the Link Veriﬁer is informed with timeout message
for the given SPV_PKT packet that had been sent for verifying a speciﬁc link.
Example 4. After successful installation of the ﬂow on switch S11, Link Veriﬁer
requests the Packet Sender to send the SPV_PKT packet to switch S11, as depicted in
Figure 9. The switch S11 receives the SPV_PKT, ﬁnds a match in its ﬂow table for
it, and forwards the packet on its port S11:Port2. After the packet is received by
switch S14, since the port S11:Port2 is connected to S14:Port2 and not S12:Port2,
switch S14 performs a lookup in its ﬂow tables to ﬁnd a match for it. However,
switch S14 does not ﬁnd any match for the received stealthy SPV_PKT packet, there-
fore, it encapsulates the SPV_PKT in an OFTP_PACKET_IN message and forwards it
to the SDN controller. At this point, the Packet Collector module is continuously
listening to SDN controller and data plane communications and upon receiving an
OFTP_PACKET_IN with an SPV_PKT in its contents, it adds the OFTP_PACKET_IN mes-
sage to the PKT_DB database (the details of PKT_DB database is discussed in
Section 3.2.3) and send a copy of it to the Link Veriﬁer module.
Step 5: Validating a Speciﬁc Link. The ﬁnal step of the link veriﬁcation proce-
dure is to decide on the validity of a link. To this end, there are two possible scenarios.
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In the ﬁrst scenario, the Link Veriﬁer receives an OFTP_PACKET_IN message with a
content of the SPV_PKT packet and examines the SPV_PKT packet to match it with
the link that the packet is originally designed for, more speciﬁcally, the matching
is performed by utilizing a hash value that has been inserted into the payload of
SPV_PKT packets. At this point, if the SPV_PKT packet is sent back from the destina-
tion endpoint switch of a given link, the link is validated and marked as “Legitimate”.
Otherwise, the SPV_PKT packet is sent back from a switch other than the destination
endpoint of a given link. In this case, the link and its sender switch are marked as
“Malicious”.
More intuitively, since SPV does not rely on LLDP packets, and because SPV_PKT
packets are indistinguishable from other packets that are already traversing the net-
work, the malicious switches are deceived and caught. In the second scenario, the
SPV_PKT packet is not received by the Packet Collector for any reason, e.g., it is
dropped due to network congestion or packet loss possibilities, and the link stays in
“Not-Validated” state until the next veriﬁcation round.
Example 5. After the Link Veriﬁer module receives information from Packet Collec-
tor module, it queries for the SPV_PKT packets with the Link_ID of the S11:Port2-
S12:Port2 from the PKT_DB database (depicted in Figure 10). Then it conﬁrms
the identity of the SPV_PKT packet using the hash value provided in its payload, i.e.,
the hash of the ID of the SPV_PKT packet and the timestamp that it has been gener-
ated, by comparing the mentioned hash value with the calculated hash value earlier in
the process of SPV_PKT packet generation. If both values match, the link S11:Port2-
S12:Port2 is validated and marked as “Validated” in the tree data structure with the
help of the Topology Mapper module. However, since in this example the received
SPV_PKT packet is sent from switch S14, the DPID of the OFTP_PACKET_IN message
sender and Switch_ID value in the PKT_DB database for the received SPV_PKT
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Algorithm 1 Link Veriﬁcation Algorithm
1: Input: links : List of links to be veriﬁed
2: procedure VerificationPreparation(links)
3: for each l ∈ links do
4: srcSwStat = ﬂowMngr.getStat(l.srcSwID)
5: dstSwStat = ﬂowMngr.getStat(l.dstSwID)
6: SPV_PKT = decPktHandler.pktGen(srcSwStat, dstSwStat, l)
7: SPV_Flow = genFlow(SPV_PKT.header,l.srcSwID, l.srcSwPort)
8: ﬂowMngr.installFlow(SPV_Flow, l.srcSwID)
9: while true do
10: if decPktHandler.pktSender(SPV_PKT , l.srcSwID, l.srcSwPort)
== “Successful" then
11: l.SPV PKT = SPV_PKT  storing the latest SPV_PKT for
each link
12: break
13: Input: PKTIN_SPV : collected OFTP_PACKET_IN sent from Packet Collec-
tor that contains SPV_PKT
14: Input: SwID : the switch ID of the OFTP_PACKET_IN message sender
15: procedure LinkValidation(PKTIN_SPV, SwID)
16: for each l ∈ links do
17: if l.SPV PKT == PKTIN_SPV.payload then
18: if SwID == l.dstSwID then
19: l.Status = “Legitimate”
20: else if SwID = l.dstSwID then
21: l.Status = “Malicious”
22: maliciousSwList.add(SwID)
packet does not match, and both the link S11:Port2-S12:Port2 and the switch S14
are marked as “Malicious”.
Algorithm 1 shows Steps 1-4 through the VeriﬁcationPreparation procedure and
Step 5 through the LinkValidation procedure.
3.2.3 Stealthy Packet Handler Algorithm
This section discusses the Stealthy Packet Handler algorithm.
Step 1: Collecting OFTP_PACKET_IN Messages. The ﬁrst step of the
Stealthy Packet handler is to collect OFTP_PACKET_IN messages that have a host-
generated packet in their content, via the Packet Collector module, and build a pool
of packets stored in a locally maintained database, i.e., PKT_DB. These packets are
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utilized in designing the SPV_PKT packets in a way that a malicious host or switch is
not able to distinguish those packets from a regular host-generated packet that has
already traversed the network. Hence, upon receiving an OFTP_PACKET_IN message
that contains a host-generated packet in its content, the Packet Collector extracts the
header information of the OFTP_PACKET_IN message and the host-generated packet
inside the message along with its size and other useful information, and stores them in
its local database. The PKT_DB database contains a schema as depicted in Figure
10.
In Figure 10, for each entry in PKT_DB, the PKT_ID speciﬁes a unique identiﬁer
for each packet that is stored in the database. The PKT_ID is never exposed to
the outside of SPV since it is a secret information which is used for authentication
purposes (details are discussed later in this section). PKT_type can be either "Host
Packet" or "SPV_PKT", since we collect OFTP_PACKET_IN messages with contents
of either host-generated packets or SPV_PKT packets. The Switch_DPID value has
the DPID of the switch that has sent the OFTP_PACKET_IN message, this information
can be achieved by making use of the MAC address of the OFTP_PACKET_IN message
sender switch. PKT_IN_hdr and Data_hdr contain the header of the OFTP_PACKET_IN
message and the corresponding packet in its content, respectively. Link_ID contains
the ID of the link that the SPV_PKT has been sent to verify its validity. Finally, the
timestamp shows the timestamp that an SPV_PKT is generated. Some of the above-
mentioned attributes might not contain any value depending on the packet type, i.e.,
either HostPacket or SPV_PKT.
Step 2: Generating SPV_PKT Packets. This step is to generate stealthy
probing SPV_PKT packets for data-plane link veriﬁcation purpose. Depending on two
possible scenarios, i.e., (i) ﬁrst round of veriﬁcation of a link and (ii) further rounds


















Figure 10: PKT_DB database table schema
Step 2a. The Packet Collector module searches in its database for the packets
that do not have the Switch_DPID of the link endpoint switches, i.e., the endpoint
switches of a link to be veriﬁed must not appear in the Switch_DPID ﬁeld of the
packet that is selected from the PKT_DB database. The list of the selected packets,
satisfying the mentioned condition, is sent to the Packet Generator module. Then
the Packet Generator randomly chooses a packet from the list, forges the source and
destination IP and/or MAC addresses (depending on an IP or Ethernet packet), and
ports, and sends it to the Link Veriﬁer module. At this point, a unique ID i.e.,
PKT_ID, is assigned to the packet to be used in packet matching. Since OpenFlow
switches do not process packet payloads, the Packet Generator calculates the hash
value of concatenation of PKT_ID and the timestamp of the moment that the packet
is generated, i.e., Hash(PKT_ID||timestamp), and stores it as the SPV_PKT packet
payload. If the payload size of the original packet is larger than the size of the hash
value, we append dummy data to the SPV_PKT packet payload. A copy of the sent
SPV_PKT packet is stored in the PKT_DB database along with the link information,
i.e., Link_ID, which is used in further rounds of link veriﬁcation (Step 2b).
Step 2b. If there is a match for a given link’s ID inside the PKT_DB database,
the Packet Generator fetches the related SPV_PKT packet and sends the packet to a
Line Sweep algorithm which produces the next probing packet for verifying this link.
Upon receiving the returned packet, the payload is added similarly as mentioned in
Step 2a. Then, the newly generated SPV_PKT packet is sent to the Link Veriﬁer and
replaced with the previous SPV_PKT packet inside the PKT_DB database for a given











Figure 11: Line sweep mechanism for selecting stealthy probing packets used in
second or further rounds of veriﬁcation
As mentioned earlier, the Packet Generator records the latest SPV_PKT packet
for each link to be used to generate the next probing packets. After generating an
SPV_PKT packet for the ﬁrst round of veriﬁcation for a certain link, the generated
packet is sent to a sweep line algorithm proposed in [26] to generate further probing
packets. Usually, a sweep line algorithm is used to solve a problem by sweeping
an imaginary line over a dimension stopping at some points. In the context of our
work, the problem is to choose the next probing packets in a way that we keep the
stealthiness of the chosen SPV_PKT packets. In [26], the line sweep algorithm is
used to choose probing packets to infer ﬁrewall rules, and the method searches for
packet headers in (n−1) shapes in an n-dimensional space, by searching for a straight
line that is not diagonal but having the characteristics of vertical or horizontal. The
method generates packets that cover the sweeping line with a 45-degree angle between
starting and ending points. After the algorithm searched for all packets (Figure 11(a)),
it chooses another line and repeats the procedure till the whole space is covered
(Figures 11(b) and 11(c)).
We leverage the line sweep algorithm in [26] with some variations similar to [31]
for selecting SPV_PKT packets’ header information for second or further rounds of
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Figure 12: SPV_PKT packet generation procedure ﬂow chart
procedure. The algorithm is used to select the IP addresses, and port numbers of
the SPV_PKT packet header. So, based on each SPV_PKT packet of a given link, to
select the next probing packet, the IP addresses and port numbers are incremented
sequentially and simultaneously.
Figure 12 provides the ﬂow chart for SPV_PKT packet generation procedure.
Step 3: Sending SPV_PKT Packets. This step is to transmit SPV_PKT packets
towards a given switch for the purpose of data-plane link veriﬁcation. Upon receiving
a request from the Link Veriﬁer module, a generated SPV_PKT packet is sent towards
the source endpoint of the link to be veriﬁed, via the Packet Sender module.
Algorithm 2 details the above-mentioned steps.
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Algorithm 2 Stealthy Packet Handler Algorithm
1: Input: PKT_IN : the exchanged OFTP_PACKET_IN messages between Open-
Flow switches and the SDN controller
2: Input: SwID : the switch ID of the OFTP_PACKET_IN message sender
3: procedure pktCollector(PKT_IN, SwID)
4: if PKT_IN.payload = controlMsg then
5: pktDataBase.add(PKT_IN , SwID)
6: if PKT_IN.payload == SPV_PKT then
7: LinkV erfication.LinkV alidation(PKTIN_SPV , SwID)
8: Input: srcSwStat : ﬂows and status of source endpoint of the link
9: Input: dstSwStat : ﬂows and status of destination endpoint of the link
10: Input: link : the link information
11: procedure pktGen(srcSwStat, dstSwStat, link)
12: pkts = getPktsFromDB(srcSwID, dstSwID)
13: if link.SPV PKT = null then
14: pkt = lineSweepPktGen(l.SPV PKT )
15: else
16: pkt = pktSelector(pkts)  select and forge the header of a random packet
17: return pkt
18: Input: PKT : a packet to be sent
19: Input: SwID : the switch ID to send the packet to
20: Input: SwPort : the port number of the switch to send the packet on
21: procedure packetSender(PKT, SwID, SwPort)








This chapter describes the implementation details of SPV and provides the experi-
ments conducted to evaluate the SPV.
4.1 Implementation
Before we delve into the implementation details of SPV, we provide an overview of
the environment and the tools we use to implement SPV, as well as an LLDP relay
attack implementation.
4.1.1 Environment Setup
We use OpenDaylight (ODL) [1] as the SDN controller and implement the data plane
using Mininet network emulator [28, 38]. ODL is an open platform for automating
large scale networks. ODL has a model-driven service adaptation layer (MD-SAL)
architecture, in which network applications and network devices are considered as
objects and communicate with each other by using the northbound and southbound
API plugins’ functions, that are provided by SAL [37, 1]. Mininet [24, 38] is a network
emulator that can be used to deploy OpenFlow switches and virtual hosts while
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Figure 13: Installing required features on ODL controller
connecting them using virtual links in a single machine.
4.1.1.1 Control Plane Setup
In our setup, we install ODL Carbon release on a virtual machine running a Linux
Ubuntu server 16.04 with two Intel(R) Xeon(R) E3-1271 v3 CPUs and 6GB of RAM.
We mainly focus on the SDN controller functionality of ODL by making use of the
REST northbound API and OpenFlow southbound API. Furthermore, in our work,
we utilize some of ODL’s features such as a) odl-restconf, b) odl-l2switch, c) odl-
mdsal, d) odl-dlux, e) network-topology and f) packet-processing. Figure 13 illustrates
the installation of the above-mentioned features on ODL controller.
The mentioned features are installed on ODL to mainly provide access to rest API,
optimization of packet forwarding for learning switches, generic support for applica-
tions, graphical user interface, network topology and processing and forwarding pack-
ets along with instructions, respectively. We conﬁgure ODL to instruct data-plane
switches that join the network to install reactive ﬂows instead of proactive ﬂooding
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ﬂows and to forward the newly received packets to the ODL for further instructions
through the following conﬁguration ﬁle. Moreover, proactive ﬂows for LLDP packets
(Ether type 0x88cc) is installed upon joining a switch to the network for discovering
the network topology. The above-mentioned conﬁgurations are depicted in Listings
5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, respectively.




Listing 4.1: Disabling proactive ﬂooding ﬂow installation




Listing 4.2: Sending new packets to controller for further instructions















Figure 14: A fat-tree topology with four core switches
4.1.1.2 Data Plane Setup
To set up data-plane devices, we utilize Mininet 2.2.1 on a separate Linux virtual
machine running Linux Ubuntu server 16.04 with two Intel(R) Xeon(R) E3-1271 v3
CPUs and 4GB of RAM. We utilize OpenFlow version 1.3, as it is the latest supported
version by Mininet 2.2.1. The OpenFlow switches in the data plane are chosen to
be software based Open vSwitch [42] switches. We consider a fat-tree topology [3],
which is one of the most used network topologies in nowadays large data centers [58],
for our data plane. A fat-tree topology comprises four layers; core switches on top,
aggregate switches at the second layer, edge switches at the third layer and hosts or
servers are at the lowest layer. Figure 14 illustrates a fat-tree topology with four core
switches.
4.1.1.3 Traﬃc Generator
To better simulate an SDN environment, it is required to generate and exchange traﬃc
between hosts, passing through OpenFlow switches in our emulated environment. To
this purpose, we utilize iPerf [20], which is a powerful tool to generate both UDP and
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Figure 15: An iPerf TCP traﬃc generation between hosts h1 and h2
TCP traﬃc between two endpoints. This tool is later used in Section 4.2 to generate
traﬃc between diﬀerent pairs of hosts. Figure 15 shows the details of generating a
TCP traﬃc for the duration of 10 seconds between two given hosts, h1 as the TCP
server and h2 as the TCP client, and the report after the termination of the session.
4.1.1.4 Attack Implementation
In this section, we implement an LLDP relay packet attack using a malicious switch
to show the feasibility of the attack that can occur in an SDN environment. In this
implementation, we create a fat-tree topology with two core switches by making use
of a Python script which leverages Mininet’s python libraries for this purpose. We
choose the ODL to be the SDN controller and OpenvSwitch as the underlying data-
plane switches. Figure 16 illustrates the network view of the ODL controller on the
above-mentioned fat-tree topology.
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Figure 16: A fat-tree topology with two core switches in the view of the ODL
Controller
Figure 17: Flow rules of switch openflow:2002 before adding LLDP relay rules
In the shown topology in Figure 16, we try to create a fake link between switches
openflow:3002 and openflow:1002 in the view of the SDN controller by relay-
ing the LLDP packets between them by modifying the ﬂow rules of the switch
openflow:2002. Unmodiﬁed ﬂow rules of the switch openflow:2002 are shown in
Figure 17.
As it is illustrated in Figure 18, the two ﬂow rules with higher priority are added
to relay LLDP packets between ports port 1 and port 4 in switch openflow:2002.
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Figure 18: Flow rules of switch openflow:2002 after adding LLDP relay rules
Figure 19: Afake link creation in the view of the ODL Controller
This action creates a fake link in the view of the controller between switches
openflow:3002 and opneflow:1002 as depicted with a blue line in Figure 19.
4.1.2 SPV’s Implementation Details
We install SPV on the same machine that runs the ODL (i.e., a virtual machine
running a Linux Ubuntu server 16.04 with two Intel(R) Xeon(R) E3-1271 v3 CPUs
and 6GB of RAM).Note that although SPV and ODL are installed on the same ma-
chine, they work independent of each other, meaning that they can be installed on
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two separate machines as well. The main programming language used to implement
SPV is Java [22]. We utilize Scapy’s [50] Python libraries for the purposes of SPV_PKT
packet generation and encoding. We implement the SPV in both single thread and
multi-thread modes, by utilizing Java’s multi-threading capabilities in order to en-
hance the response time of link veriﬁcation when there are more than one links to
be veriﬁed simultaneously. The following discusses implementation details of main
SPV’s components.
4.1.2.1 Link Veriﬁcation
The Link Veriﬁcation module (see Figure 8 for more details) is implemented to com-
municate with ODL’s northbound API for querying the changes in network topology,
storing the topology locally, installing ﬂows on data-plane switches and performing
link veriﬁcation (an example of ODL’s rest API output for a linear network topology
with three switches is depicted in Figure 20). More speciﬁcally, the Link Update
Checker interacts with ODL’s opendaylight-topology module to keep track of changes
in the data-plane network. Then, SPV’s Topology Mapper module keeps the lat-
est topology locally by utilizing regular expression techniques to parse the output
of the opendaylight-topology. The data structure to keep the topology is a map of
the network topology which consists of links and nodes and their connections along
with other useful information, e.g., switch statistics or links’ status. Note that the
validity information of a link is also stored within the tree data structure. A part of
the output of a linear network topology with three switches after parsing and storing
the data locally in SPV is shown in Figure 21 which is an illustration of collected
information over a link and an OpenFlow switch.
The next step in Link Veriﬁcation procedure is to go through the unveriﬁed links,
send a request to Stealthy Packet Handler module for a generation of an SPV_PKT
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Figure 20: An output of opendaylight-topology upon a request to query the ODL’s
network view
Figure 21: Details of a stored link and an OpenFlow switch
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packet, and forward it towards the link that is to be veriﬁed. The procedure of
packet generation and forwarding it towards the link to be veriﬁed is discussed in the
next subsection.
4.1.2.2 Stealthy Packet Handler
The Stealthy Packet Handler module consists of multiple Java classes along with
Python scripts which utilize Scapy [50], i.e., a packet manipulation tool aimed to send,
sniﬀ, dissect and forge network packets. The interaction with the Link Veriﬁcation
module is done via a Java class. After a request for packet generation is sent from
Link Veriﬁer, a Python script utilizes Scapy’s [50] libraries to generate and encode
SPV_PKT packets in the Base64 format and send them towards speciﬁc links using
ODL’s northbound API. In Listing 5.4 we illustrate the content of an API request to
send a Base64 encoded SPV_PKT packet, using the northbound API of the ODL.















This section presents our experiments for evaluating the performance of SPV. We
conduct four groups of experiments to evaluate the performance and accuracy of
SPV. We ﬁrst measure the eﬃciency of SPV by varying the complexity of the network.
Then, we evaluate the resource consumption, i.e., CPU and memory usage, of SPV.
We also measure the eﬀect of diﬀerent kinds of attackers that tend to increase packet
loss, congest the network and relay the traﬃc, on SPV. We further implement SPV
in a real SDN/cloud topology to verify its applicability and evaluate its performance.
To this end, ﬁrst we discuss the network topology used in our experiments, and then
each group of experiments is detailed.
Network Topology. As mention in Section 4.1.1.2, we consider a fat-tree topol-
ogy [3] for our data plane. We vary the switches from ﬁve to 40 where the largest
topology has eight core switches, 16 aggregate switches, and 16 edge switches, which
comply with the size of a medium-sized data center to accommodate tens of thousands
of servers [3, 58]. Even though the reported results in the next section show that we
could expect SPV to be expandable to large data centers, we only vary the number
of switches up to 40 due to the resource limitations of our environment. However, to
stress the SPV and evaluate its accuracy, we conduct further set of experiments to
measure SPV’s performance for up to 5,000 link veriﬁcations in the network.
4.2.1 The Eﬃciency of SPV
In the ﬁrst group of our experiments, we measure the time requirement of SPV in
diﬀerent situations. The reported veriﬁcation time includes the time for selecting
the link, generating SPV_PKT packet, installing ﬂow rules, sending and receiving the
SPV_PKT packet, and ﬁnally verifying both the SPV_PKT packet and the link. Fig-
ure 22 shows the time required for SPV to verify one link and Figure 23 shows the
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Figure 22: Time required by SPV to verify a new link while varying the number
of switches up to 40 and number of links up to 96 in both single and multi-thread
modes
time required for SPV to verify all existing links in the network. More speciﬁcally,
Figure 22 depicts the time in milliseconds to incrementally verify a newly added link
in both single thread and multi-thread modes while varying the size of the network by
increasing the number of switches from ﬁve to 40 with a maximum of 96 data-plane
links. In this case, the average veriﬁcation time is 102 milliseconds, which shows
the near-real-time nature of SPV to verify a newly added link. Also, the veriﬁcation
time is independent of the size of the network (e.g., number of switches and their
connected links). Whereas Figure 23 shows the time required by SPV to verify a
group of links in both single thread and multi-thread modes while varying the size
of the network by increasing the number switches from ﬁve to 40 with a maximum
96 data-plane links. The veriﬁcation time for the largest dataset in the single thread
mode is 26.1 seconds. We further improve the veriﬁcation time by conducting them
through the multi-thread mode, which reduces the veriﬁcation time to 10.6 seconds.
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Figure 23: Time required by SPV to verify all existing links while varying the
number of switches up to 40 and number of links up to 96 in both single and multi-
thread modes
Even though the increase of the number of switches in the network results in the
increase of veriﬁcation time for both single and multi-thread modes, the increase of
the veriﬁcation time remains almost linear in the multi-thread mode. These results
show the practicality of SPV in medium-sized data centers to verify their topology.
4.2.2 Resource Consumption by SPV
The second group of the experiments is to measure the resource consumption (i.e.,
CPU and memory usage) by SPV. Figure 24 depicts the average CPU and Figure 25
depicts the average memory usage to verify all existing links in the network by varying
the number of switches for single thread mode. More speciﬁcally, Figure 24 shows
that SPV on average requires about 20% of the CPU, which is a reasonable amount.
Figure 25 depicts the memory consumption by SPV while verifying all existing links
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Figure 24: Average CPU usage by SPV to verify all existing links while varying the
number of switches up to 40 and the number of links accordingly
for diﬀerent network sizes. Even though we observe an increase in the memory con-
sumption for larger datasets, it still remains below 2%. Note that, the CPU and
memory consumption for verifying a single link is negligible and hence not reported
in this thesis.
4.2.3 Evaluating SPV Against Diﬀerent Attacks
The objective of the third set of experiments is to investigate the eﬀect of packet loss,
network traﬃc and the packet relay attack on SPV. To this end Figures 26 show the
percentage of unveriﬁed links in the ﬁrst round of SPV for 5,000 link veriﬁcations in
the network while varying the packet loss rate and Figure 27 shows the percentage of
unveriﬁed links in the ﬁrst round of SPV for 5,000 link veriﬁcations in the network
while increasing traﬃc throughput. To reduce this eﬀect, SPV periodically sends
SPV_PKT packets until a link is veriﬁed and hence, all of the network links are even-
tually veriﬁed. In this set of experiments, we utilize a fat-tree topology with two core
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Figure 25: Average memory usage by SPV to verify all existing links while varying
the number of switches up to 40 and the number of links accordingly
switches, four aggregate switches and four edge switches where the bandwidth of core
switches to aggregate switches are set to 100Mbps and the bandwidth for aggregate
switches to edge switches is set to 10Mbps. The spanning tree protocol is used to
eliminate loops in the network routing. To generate traﬃc in this set of experiments,
we set up two pairs of iPerf [20] clients and servers in the network and exchange
both UDP and TCP traﬃc between them while changing the iPerf client/server pairs
between existing hosts in the network.
More speciﬁcally, as it is illustrated in Figure 26 with the increase of the packet
loss rate, the percentage of the unveriﬁed links linearly increases due to the fact
that the SPV_PKT packets may be also lost; However, since the distribution of packet
loss rate is among all links in the network, and SPV only deals with one link at a
time, the percentage of unveriﬁed links is always less than packet loss rate in the
network which concludes that our approach is resilient to high packet loss rates in the
network. In Figure 27 by increasing the traﬃc throughput to the maximum allowed
51


















Figure 26: Evaluating SPV with the presence of attackers in the network that tend
to increase packet loss while varying the links packet loss rate (%)
bandwidth while keeping the loss rate to 5%, the percentage of unveriﬁed links stays
almost constant and with a very small amount of change. The reason is that the ﬂow
installed by SPV to forward the SPV_PKT packet has a higher priority than other ﬂows
on a given switch and this fact makes SPV be independent of network congestion and
only be dependent on network packet loss rate in this set of experiment.
As discussed later in Section 5, a malicious switch may forward selected traﬃc
that may or may not include SPV_PKT packets. Hence, we measure the percentage of
SPV_PKT packets being aﬀected in the presence of a malicious switch that forwards
10% to 50% of the traﬃc at diﬀerent time intervals.
Figure 28 shows that the amount of forwarded SPV_PKT packets remains less than
30% in the case a malicious switch forwards all the packets in 50% of the time,
however, in this experiments we considered an extreme case by assuming the ma-
licious switch is not detected until last round of veriﬁcation which not always true
and SPV might detect it much earlier. The resilience of SPV to this attack can be
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Figure 27: Evaluating SPV with the presence of attackers in the network that tend
to congest the network by showing percentage of unveriﬁed links while varying traﬃc
throughput (Mbps)
further improved by using diﬀerent probabilistic functions with diﬀerent distributions
in choosing the time intervals for sending the SPV_PKT packets.
4.2.4 Applicability of SPV in a Real SDN/Cloud Topology
The objective of our last set of experiments is to validate the applicability of SPV in a
real SDN/cloud topology. To this end, we utilize an accessible part of the topology of
a real SDN/cloud hosted at one of the largest telecommunication vendors that com-
prises of OpenStack [43] cloud with 22 compute nodes, each having a software-based
OpenFlow switch, to reside thousands of VMs. All 22 OVS switches are connected to
each other in a mesh architecture having 231 bi-directional links. We further run the
mentioned topology with ODL controller to be able to run SPV. Table 3 reports the
results obtained based on this real topology and compares them with the results for
our largest fat-tree topology having 40 switches and 96 links. The results illustrate
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Figure 28: Evaluating SPV with the presence of attackers in the network that tend
to relay the traﬃc by measuring the percentage of relayed SPV_PKT packets while
varying the percentage of the time that the attacker may relay all the traﬃc
Table 3: SPV’s performance on a real SDN/cloud topology and Mininet in both
single (ST) and multi (MT) thread modes
Results SDN/Cloud Mesh Mininet Fat-Tree
All link Veriﬁcation Time (MT) 13.2052 s 10.6406 s
All link Veriﬁcation Time (ST) 134.147 s 26.1725 s
Single Link Veriﬁcation Time (ST) 100.306 ms 94.8919 ms
CPU Consumption (ST) 8.50294 % 18.79099 %
Memory Consumption (ST) 1.81817 % 1.81003 %
that the veriﬁcation time for an incremental link veriﬁcation in the network remains
almost constant (i.e., in average around 100ms) independent of network topology,
and the veriﬁcation time for all links in the multi-thread mode can rise up to 13
seconds. Table 3 also shows other measurements such as CPU and memory consump-
tion of SPV in both topologies. Those results indicate a reasonable performance and
demonstrate the practicality of our approach in a real-world SDN/cloud.
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Chapter 5
Security Analysis and Discussion
This chapter discusses the security analysis of SPV as well as further discussions over
SPV.
5.1 Security Analysis
This section discusses how SPV may overcome various attacks.
5.1.1 Stealthiness Feature of SPV_PKT packets
Security of SPV relies on the so-called stealthiness property of a probing packet,
meaning the packet cannot be distinguished from other host-generated packets trav-
eling through the network. To this end, SPV builds a pool of packets, by collecting
the traversed packets between the hosts. Afterwards, SPV selects packets from the
pool, modiﬁes their header and forwards them as SPV_PKT packets to selected switches
to verify the links between them (Section 3.2.3 discusses the SPV_PKT generation pro-
cedure). The following discusses how diﬀerent ﬁelds of SPV_PKT packet may aﬀect the
stealthiness property.
In an SPV_PKT packet, some ﬁelds must not match with those of any host-generated
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packets, whereas the rest of the ﬁelds must match, in order to ensure the stealthiness
property. Suppose P is a pool of host-generated packets, that have been traversed
through the network, decapsulated from OFTP_PACKET_IN messages sent to the SDN
controller. An SPV_PKT packet, SPV_PKT_i is generated based on a reference packet
from the pool P. In SPV_PKT_i, Eth_Type ﬁeld and packet’s payload size match
with those of the reference packet. Otherwise, there is a high chance that a malicious
switch might identify the SPV_PKT_i based on the unusual ﬁelds of the packet. On
the other hand, Src_IP, Dst_IP, Src_MAC, Dst_MAC, Src_Port and Dst_Port ﬁelds in
SPV_PKT_i must not match with the same ﬁelds of the reference packet. Otherwise,
a malicious switch might be suspicious when it observes similar packets with the same
source and destination addresses multiple times in the network.
In the following, we consider diﬀerent threats to the stealthiness property and
discuss how SPV can address them.
5.1.2 Relaying or Dropping Packets
A malicious switch may evolve to react to SPV by forwarding traﬃc including SPV
packets passing through it so that the fake link remains undetected.
However, to be undetected by SPV, the malicious switch must forward every
single packet traversing the fake link. Therefore, this reaction is against the original
objective of the attacker, because by forwarding all the traﬃc (i.e., creating a fake
link to attack availability), the malicious switch is actually working as a link. Hence,
a more practical adversary might partially forward the traﬃc within certain time
intervals (since SPV randomly chooses time intervals to send SPV_PKT packets) hoping
that it might also forward the SPV_PKT packets among the forwarded traﬃc to keep
the fake link undetected. We further measured the eﬀect of such attack on SPV in
Section 4.2. Moreover, to detect such attacks, one potential solution is to compare
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time diﬀerences between packets traversing on diﬀerent links; which is considered as
a potential future work.
Alternatively, a malicious switch may choose to only relay the LLDP packets
and drop every other packet including SPV packets in an attempt to confuse SPV.
However, this kind of attack is beyond the scope of this work, since SPV focuses
on the integrity of SDN controller’s view over the network topology and this attack
targets the availability of the network functionality.
5.1.3 Replaying SPV_PKT Packets
With the presence of an intelligent malicious switch (i.e., a soft switch), a forged
SPV_PKT packet might be generated and used to degrade the accuracy of SPV. A
malicious attacker may mimic the packet generation mechanism of SPV and utilize
the history of packets to generate forged SPV_PKT packets and send them back to
the SDN controller, pretending the SPV_PKT packet is returning from the other end
of the fake link, to deceive SPV. However, as discussed earlier in Section 3.2.3, SPV
addresses this issue by authenticating each received SPV_PKT packet. More speciﬁcally,
to enable authentication of SPV_PKT packets, SPV adds a unique hash value, i.e.,
Hash(PKT_ID||timestamp), for each SPV_PKT packet in their payload to prevent the
replay attack on SPV_PKT packets. Moreover, through the aforementioned unique hash
value, which includes a freshness proof (i.e., timestamp), SPV prevents an attacker
from replaying already used and valid SPV_PKT packets to hide another fake link.
5.1.4 Learning SPV_PKT Packet’s Structure
Even though OpenFlow switches by design are not meant to process packet pay-
loads, the presence of soft switches in the network allows an attacker to learn the
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nature of SPV_PKT packets by processing the network traﬃc. For example, an in-
telligent malicious switch might process the OFTP_PACKET_IN messages that contain
host-generated packets to measure their payload size to distinguish SPV_PKT packets
and stop forwarding them. This might happen since the hash value that is inserted
into the payload of an SPV_PKT packet has a constant size. To address this issue, we
keep the payload size of the SPV_PKT packet the same as the payload size of the ref-
erence packet from which the SPV_PKT packet is generated, by padding dummy data
to SPV_PKT packet’s payload. Thus, SPV overcomes malicious switches that might
abuse the packet payload size to breach the stealthiness property of SPV_PKT packets.
Moreover, selecting packets from the packet pool and forging their header ﬁelds
randomly might not help SPV to hold the stealthiness property. Since an intelligent
malicious switch might keep a history of packets and leverage learning methods to
keep track of packet types and their header to correctly identify SPV_PKT packets.
To overcome this problem, we send the chosen SPV_PKT packets to a line sweep algo-
rithm (as discussed in Section 3.2.3) to choose the header information of next probing
packets for further veriﬁcation rounds. This helps the SPV to hold the stealthiness
property of SPV_PKT packets by keeping the source and destination addresses of each
SPV_PKT packet very close to a previously sent SPV_PKT packet for a speciﬁc link for
a certain period of time.
5.1.5 Injecting Packets by a Malicious Host
A malicious host may inject unique packets into the network to inﬂuence the SPV_PKT
packet generation in order to breach the stealthiness feature of SPV_PKT packets. For
this purpose, a malicious host may inject packets with some speciﬁc ﬁngerprints such
as unique payload size or type. However, this attack only works when the following
conditions are satisﬁed: i) the SPV_PKT packet is generated out of the injected packets
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by the malicious host, which can be achieved by a considerable amount of injected
packets into the network without being detected by other network security solutions
such as IDS, ii) the owner of the malicious host also has a compromised switch, which
is not connected to the same host (as SPV_PKT packets are never chosen to verify the
same switch from where the original packet has been collected), and iii) the SPV_PKT
packet is sent to verify the connecting links of the same compromised switch which
involves a considerable amount of uncertainty added by SPV.
5.2 Discussion
This section discusses diﬀerent concerns on SPV.
5.2.1 Exhausting Flow Table Capacity of SDN Switches
There exist several attacks (as described in [30, 52]) to exhaust the ﬂow table capacity
of SDN switches which may aﬀect the availability by adding new ﬂow rules on those
switches. Consequently, these attacks may aﬀect the veriﬁcation process of SPV by
preventing the installation of ﬂow rules related to forwarding the SPV_PKT packets.
Even though such ﬂow table overﬂow attacks are beyond the scope of this work,
existing solutions (e.g., [59]) to address them could be leveraged to avoid any eﬀect
on SPV.
5.2.2 Eﬀect of Encrypted Communication Between Control
and Data Planes
In case TLS is enabled for secure communications, administrators require to share
en/decryption keys of control messages with SPV; which might be a practical as-
sumption for an administrator intending to protect his/her network topology from
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poisoning attacks. However, if SPV would be implemented within the SDN con-
troller, this explicit sharing of keys is unnecessary.
5.2.3 Implementing SPV within SDN Controller
The rationale behind placing SPV outside of SDN controller is to make it applicable to
diﬀerent implementations (e.g., [48, 13, 47]) of SDN controller with minimal eﬀort.
However, placing SPV within the SDN controller may help to further improve the
performance of SPV. For example, retrieving control messages or network topology
would be much faster in the latter case. The downside of such design is the decrease in
the security of SPV, since the independence of SPV makes it even more secure as SPV
can be a hardened box/software which is easier to secure than SDN controller with a
wide range of functionalities, as well as the redundant eﬀorts required to integrate it




During this master thesis work, other than SPV, which is the main contribution of
this master thesis project, we also contributed to other projects that are described in
the following sections.
6.1 Runtime Veriﬁcation of Cloud-Wide VM-Level
Network Isolation
Multi-tenancy is one of the unique provided features of today’s cloud systems which
may lead to some security concerns such as network isolation of each cloud tenant’s
virtual resources. Furthermore, due to some built-in challenges in the cloud environ-
ment, such as the sheer size of virtual networks and VM-level and distributed network
access control, verifying the network isolation becomes a very diﬃcult task specially
when it comes to pair-wise VM-reachability veriﬁcation. However, TenantGuard [56]
propose a scalable run-time solution for could-wide, VM-to-VM isolation veriﬁcation
by leveraging the hierarchy of virtual networks, eﬃcient data structures, incremental
design and parallel computing for better performance. TenantGuard is implemented
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and tested on OpenStack and its performance both in-house and on Amazon EC2
[5], conﬁrms its scalability and eﬃciency (13 seconds for verifying 168 millions of VM
pairs).
Our contribution to this work is to set up Amazon EC2 nodes for parallel compu-
tations by leveraging the Apache Ignite [7] version 1.4.0, which is a memory-centric
multi-model distributed database, caching, and processing platform. We set up two
to 16 Amazon EC2 virtual machines and conﬁgured Apache Ignite on each machine
to run the TenantGuard auditing tasks in parallel, which takes up to 13 seconds
for verifying the reachability of 168 millions of VM pairs. Alongside the setup for
parallel processing units, we designed and implemented simulation scripts for con-
ducting diﬀerent experiments, such as computing the performance of TenantGuard
by varying the number of VMs/Subnets, Rules/Routers, and Hops by making use of
Linux Bash. Moreover, through experiments, we run and compared the performance
of TenanatGuard with NOD [32] network veriﬁcation’s implementation.
6.2 Auditing Virtual Networks Isolation Across
Cloud Layers
Some of the consequence of multiplexing virtual resources in a multi-tenant cloud
system is cross-tenants data leakage and denial of service issues. Moreover, due to
other factors such as the gap between the existing security properties inside the cloud
and the high-level description of deﬁned standards, the multi-layer design of the cloud
stack, and the dependencies between those layers makes auditing virtual network iso-
lation a very challenging task. To overcome the above-mentioned issues, ISOTOP is
designed to cover cross-layer consistent isolation veriﬁcation in a multi-tenant cloud
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environment by mainly focusing on veriﬁcation of multiple security properties at vir-
tual network layer 2 and overlay networks, namely topology isolation. The mentioned
security properties are developed based on the literature and common knowledge on
layer 2 virtual networks isolation in order to relate them to deﬁned security standards
and ﬁlling the gap between the actual existing properties in a cloud system and those
standards. Furthermore, a cross-layer network model with their inter-dependencies
and isolation mechanisms are devised to study semantics among those layers as well
as identifying and auditing the network isolation related data. More speciﬁcally, ISO-
TOP’s main job is to evaluate the consistency of layer 2 virtual network isolation by
leveraging the gathered cross-layer information between management and infrastruc-
ture layers.
Our contributions to this work are listed in the following.
1. Implementing cloud environment by utilizing OpenStack [43] Mitaka version.
In this environment, a controller and a network node with diﬀerent compute
nodes are implemented to run the ISOTOPS experiments. The connecting tech-
nology between diﬀerent nodes is switched from LinuxBridge to OpenvSwitch
to leverage the OpenFlow protocol.
2. Implementing automated attack scenarios for Intra-compute and Inter-compute
nodes which abuse the VLAN and VXLAN connections within and among com-
pute nodes to maliciously connect VMs of diﬀerent tenants in virtual network
layer-2, which is against the network isolation security standards. These at-
tacks show the need to verify the compliance of network isolation properties in
diﬀerent layers of a cloud system.
3. Implementing automated data collection from diﬀerent layers of the imple-
mented cloud system for auditing.
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4. Implementing 11 properties for isolation properties at the infrastructure man-
agement level, isolation properties at the implementation level, and topology
consistency properties, using CPS solver, Sugar [54], and diﬀerent sat-solvers,
such as Minisat, Riss, Pingeling, Lingeling, and Treengling.
5. Implementing automated veriﬁcation of the above-mentioned properties along
with conducting extensive experiments by varying diﬀerent factors such as VMs
to measure the performance of our automated tool by making use of Python
and Linux Bash.
6. Finally, we conducted further experiments by leveraging Amazon EC2 machines
to run ISOTOP in a parallel mode for one of the properties.
Note that ISOTOP is extension of [33] and is currently under revision for ACM
Transactions on Privacy and Security (TOPS) journal.
6.3 Proactive Security Auditing for Clouds
The scalability and particularly the on-demand requirements from users and cloud
service providers had made the security compliance veriﬁcation a challenging task due
to the sheer size and dynamic nature of cloud systems. The veriﬁcation of security
properties with respect to security standards can take up to minutes or sometimes
hours. However, to oﬀer proactive security auditing, PVSC [34] and its successor
LeaPS [35], which the latter one utilizes learning-based approaches in comparison to
the PVSC, have overcome this issue by studying the dependencies between cloud-
wide events and starting the veriﬁcation process before any violation occurs. More
speciﬁcally, LeaPS achieves a practical response time of 6ms to audit a cloud of
100,000 VMs which is a 50% improvement over PVSC in which the response time is
also in milliseconds.
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Our contributions to this work are listed in the following.
1. Implementing cloud environment by utilizing OpenStack [43] Mitaka version. In
this environment, a controller and a network node with diﬀerent compute nodes
are implemented to collect input for PVSC and LeaPS. The connecting tech-
nology between diﬀerent nodes is switched from LinuxBridge to OpenvSwitch
to leverage the OpenFlow protocol.
2. Conﬁguring and installing the Ceilometer service for the cloud environment to
capture the management events.
3. Implementing automated scripts to simulate the occurrences of diﬀerent cloud-
wide events as the input for the veriﬁcation engine.
4. Identifying the relationships and the dependencies between diﬀerent cloud-wide
events.
6.4 Preserving Both Privacy and Utility in Preﬁx
Preserving Anonymization of Network Traces
Auditing humongous amount of data in recent large-scale data-centers is very costly
which leads the cloud service provides to outsource their data to a third-party an-
alyst. However, there are security concerns in outsourcing the data in plain-text.
This causes the data-center and cloud service providers to anonymize the data be-
fore outsourcing them which leads them to question about the utility and privacy
of those anonymization techniques. To preserve both privacy and utility, K-Pseudo
Anonymity and N-View Defence propose a technique through allowing the third-party
analyst to generate diﬀerent views of the anonymized original data, which is mainly
network traces, that are designed to be indistinguishable from the original data even
65
though there might be adversaries with a pre-knowledge of the original data. So, the
trade-oﬀ between privacy and utility is shifted to the trade-oﬀ between privacy and
computational cost. The result of the analysis is one view, which preserves the utility,
among those generated N-views, which preserves the privacy.
Our contribution to this work is to write simulation scripts to evaluate the perfor-
mance and the privacy of the K-Pseudo Anonymity and N-View Defence by varying
diﬀerent factors such as the number of partitions, views, IP addresses in input data
sets and etc. Note that this work is under revision for the Privacy Enhancing Tech-
nologies Symposium (PETS) conference.
6.5 A Quantitative Approach to Security Compli-
ance Auditing for SDN-Based Cloud
One of the security concerns in today’s cloud systems is the co-residency of diﬀerent
tenants’ virtual infrastructures, including VMs and virtual networks. However, none
of the existing solutions handle this issue by quantitatively measuring the relative
distance of cloud resources. More speciﬁcally, Quantic proposes a novel approach
to measure the physical and virtual distances between cloud resources in order to
quantify the level of tenants’ virtual infrastructure co-residency. Moreover, instead of
providing a binary result for auditing security compliance, a degree of breaches are
provided based on the measured distances.
Note that the Quantic is under revision for IEEE/IFIP International Conference
on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN) 2018.
Our contributions to this work are listed in the following.
1. Simulating the three-layer fat-tree network topology.
2. Implementing cloud environment by utilizing OpenStack [43] Mitaka version
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and OpenvSwitch for leveraging the OpenFlow protocol, and generating the
synthetic data based on the implemented OpenStack cloud to provide large-
scale input data for evaluating the Quantic.
3. Implementing policy deﬁnitions and veriﬁcation of Quantic.





The correctness of SDN controller view on network topology is known to be critical
for making the right management decisions. However, recently discovered vulnerabil-
ities in OFDP protocol show that poisoning network view of the SDN controller may
lead to severe security attacks, such as man-in-the-middle or denial of service. In this
thesis, we proposed SPV, a novel stealthy probing-based approach, to signiﬁcantly
extend the scope of existing solutions, by generating and sending stealthy packets
to incrementally verify legitimate links and detect fake links as well as the respon-
sible malicious switches. As a proof of concept of our approach, we implemented
SPV in an emulated SDN environment using Mininet and OpenDaylight. Through
extensive experiments, we showed that SPV achieved a constant time to verify each
incremented link to the network, i.e., less than 120 milliseconds, which makes SPV a
scalable solution for large SDN networks. We also measured the performance of SPV
in a real SDN/cloud hosted at one of the largest telecommunication vendors to vali-
date the applicability of SPV in a real environment. To further improve the accuracy
and performance of SPV, considering traversal time of stealthy packets in the link
veriﬁcation procedure and integrating SPV within the SDN controller (for faster pro-
cessing of control messages or being independent of public/private key sharing) can
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be considered as potential future work. Also, to enhance the security of SPV against
certain attacks such as ﬂow table exhaustion, adapting methods such as [30] could
be beneﬁcial. Moreover, the stealthiness property of stealthy packets can be further
improved by leveraging machine learning techniques in analyzing network traﬃc to
enhance the packet generation mechanism of SPV.
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